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ABSTRACT 
Price Behavior in Tight Oligopoly* 
The study examines price behavior in tight oligopoly. The inves-
tigation proceeds from the premise that tacit collusion is the only 
rational response of firms comprising tight oligopoly. The study's 
thesis is that collusive conduct in tight oligopoly will reflect one of 
two general pricing patterns: (1) shared monopoly pricing, or (2) 
mark-up pricing. A unique empirical test of this dual price hypotheses 
is developed. The test focuses on the nature of price responses to cost 
and demand changes as reflected in a price equa~ion that is estimated for 
each of forty-two four-digit SIC industries. The study's results 
indicate infrequent, but still notable, instances of shared monopoly 
pricing. More common is evidence of mark-up pricing, a general category 
within which demand proved to be significant in roughly half of the 
industries examined. Theoretical implications of these findings are 
discussed. 
*The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Peter Asch and 
~obert Schmidt, and the support of the Dupont Summer Fellowship program. 
~his paper examines price behavior in tight oligopoly. The investi-
gation proceeds from the commonly accepted premise that tacit collusion 
is the rational response of firms comprising oligopoly. Indeed, in this 
study the collusive assumption is adopted with special force. Theoreti-
cal and empirical research underscore the importance of high market 
concentration for effective collusion [26), [16), (12). The empirical 
focus of this study is therefore limited to tight oligopoly. 
The study's thesis is that .collusive conduct under tight oligopoly 
will reflect either of two general pricing patterns: (1) monopoly 
pricing: or (2) mark-up pricing. The paper develops a test of this 
hypothesis and presents the empirical results. 
Section I.briefly reviP.ws the theories of shared monopoly and 
mark-up pricing as collusive models of oligopoly. Section II develops a 
target-return model of mark-up pricing. Section III demonstrates how 
mark-up and monopoly · pricing can be distinguished empirically, a 
distinction which serve ·s as the basis for testable hypotheses. Section 
IV describes the estimation procedure ~fa price equation and the empiri-
cal results appear in Section v. Section VI presents the study's con-
clusions. 
I. Two Views of Collusive Conduct 
The seminal discussion of collusion under oligopoly is generally· 
attributed to Chamberlin. Chamberlin emphasized the inevitability of 
recognized interdependence and "thus the conclusion of a monopoly price 
for any fairly small number of sellers." (4, p.49) Of course, sub-
sequent works have emphasized that the actual practice of tacitly 
administering shared monopoly faces formidable technical problems 
(17), [30). Briefly, these problems arise from such factors as 
l 
interfirrn cost differences, market share allocations, product differen-
tiation, and policing agreements . However, re sea rch also suggests that 
these complications are less signif _icant in tight oligopoly. Selten 
[32), in a games setting, demonstrates the extreme sensitivity of the 
shared monopoly solution to the number of firms. Further, Shepherd (34) 
notes that increased imitation of product characteristics and location is 
an increasingly rational strategy as the number of firms declines. It is · 
also argued that the ext.reme f ewness of tight oligopoly offers a bettElr 
environment for maintaining tacit price agreements. Tight oligopolists 
will perceive a lower incentive to cheat, an increased probability of 
detection, and stronger industry social · contracts [17], [23), [35]. 
Thus, it is reasonable to view the monopoly result as a .viable solution 
in tight oligopoly,:albeit, not the exclusive one. 
The appeal of collusion exists if there is a genuine prospect of 
economic profit, even though such profit falls short of the monopoly 
return. This possibil•ity suggests the need for a second-best modeling of 
collusive oligopoly, and mark-up pricing has much to recommend it. For 
example, several case studies indicate that mark-up pricing is well 
suited to · the common pricing objective of the individual firm [15], [21]. 
Furthermore, mark-up pricing is a tangible and workable guide to parallel 
price conduct [18] , [11]. Indeed, perhaps the most important attribute 
of mark-up pricing as a collusive device is its s implicity of implemen-
tation and verification {101. 
In sum, a dual interpretation of pricing under tight oligopoly may 
be appropriate. • Monopoly · price • conduct should not be dismissed a 
priori, and mark-up pricing appears to be a practical, second-best 
collusive solution. 
2 
II. THE TARGET-RETURN MODEL 
This study adopts a "target-return" model of mark-up pricing. 1 
The foundation of the target-return·model is a careful discussion of 
production cost. Figure 1 depicts unit cost (UTC) behavior summed by 
factor type. Unit material costs (UMC) are shown as constant over almost 
the entire range of plant capacity for two reasons. First, it is un-
reasonable to think of material usage as subject to the same laws of 
variable proportions as is often assumed for labor · and capital. Second, 
under normal business conditions, materials purchases in manufacturing 
. . 2 
tend to be forward contracted at fixed prices. An exception to constant 
UMC may arise, however, at very high levels of utilization. If hig~ 
utilization rates for the firm correlate with robust economic activity in 
general, manufacturers may encounter material shortages. Unit materia l 
costs will rise if the firm resorts to higher-priced spot markets. This 
possibility is reflected in Figure la by the broken line rising at 
roughly 95 percent capacity. 3 
$ 
Figure 1: Cost Structure in Manufacturing Industries 
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Unit labor costs (ULC) are shown first to decline, then level off, 
and finally rise as a plant expands production. Within each range, the 
cost pattern may be attributed to short-run productivity and/or wage 
behavior. In the region of declining costs, both factors appear to be 
influential. While studies (40), (22) have found initially rising 
average labor productivity, declining ULC may also refect a wage bill 
phenomenon. -Owing to union strength in manufacturing, one may assume 
that even during periods of slack demand, wages are downwardly r,i.gid. 
Furthermore, search and training costs may dictate the retention of 
4 
skilled workers during downturns. The net result is quasi-fixed wage 
bill and thus a region of declining ULC. In the intermediate range of 
production, say anything upward from 60 percent, one may expect further 
productivity gains to be modest. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
believe that wages should change over this interval. These factors 
suggest a region of constant unit labor costs, although labor costs may 
rise near full capacity due to tightening labor markets and the payment 
of overtime rates. 
The interpretation of the unit capital cost (UKC) is the traditional 
one, declining throughout as a fixed expenditure is spread over succes-
sively higher levels of output. The unit cost structure shown in Figure 
1 is assumed typical of manufacturing industries. The only notable 
difference between these cost relations and the conventional textbook set 
is the region of constant marginal cost. There is, however, ample 
' 5 
empirical support for this adjustment. 
Under a target-return strategy, the firm prices to achieve a desired 
rate of return on its capital investment, defined here as net expendi-
tures on plant and equipment. A target~return model typically does not 
4 
include labor or materials costs in the rate base 6 • The ·predictions of 
the target-return model follow from the assumption that the firm sets 
price relative to the unit costs incurred at a normal level of plant 
utilization. Unit costs at that point are commonly referred to as 
7 
"standard volume" costs. The formal target-return equation is written: 
( 1) Pt= UVC + (l+r)UKC 
s s 
where Pt is the target price, r is the target rate of return, ands 
denotes ~he standard volume output. This equation, in conjunction with 
the cost structure developed earlier, constitutes a target-return model. 
The model is presented graphically in Figure 2. Note that price _Pt is 
se_t as a mark-up over unit . costs calculated for illustrative purposes at 
80 percent of plant capacity. Specifically, the terms UVC and UKC in 
. s s 
the equation correspond to the vertical distances ce and be, respec-
tively. The expression (l+r)UKC is equal to ac, or alternatively, the 
s 
distance ab is equ~l to r(UKC ). The latter magnitude may be interpreted 
5 
as the actual dollar mark-up per unit, 
The target-return model represents a unique supply and demand 
framework. As drawn here -, the position of the demand curve DD implies 
that the firm will just sell its standard volume output at the target 
price and thus attain its desired return. More appropriately, however, 
DD should be understood as a notional demand curve -- the demand which 
the firm estimates for its product during the pricing decision. Of 
course, realized demand· is likely to be above or below standard output. 
In the event that notional and realized demands differ only slightly, the 
firm is believed to maintain its normal operating rate by adjusting 
inventories accordingly. For wider deviations, the firm will make 
quantity adjustments _ within a production run. The central point is that 
5 
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once the firm sets the target price, the supply curve is a horizontal 
interval at that price. In Figure ·2, the length SS denotes the supply 
interval. 
This concept of a supply interval has direct implications regarding 
whether the firm actually achieves its target profit. Recall that the 
target rate of return is applied to UKC • However, actual UKc·, and thus 
s 
the actual rate of return, will vary ·depending upon where the realized 
demand curve intersects the supply interval. To the extent that DD cuts 
to either side of point a, the firm will do slightly better or worse than 
targeted. In short, there is nothing inviolate about the target rate 
which firms apply in their price formula. Like any target, it can be 
aimed for and missed. Indeed, it seems quite reasonable that firms will 
have good and bad years, just as the model suggests. 
One final comment regarding the interpretation of Figure 2 involves 
the distinction between the broken versus solid segments of the supply 
interval. Over the length Sh, price (Pt) is less than unit total cost 
(UTC) and thus the firm is suffering losses. This segment is included 
within the ·supply interval, however, because price is still greater than 
unit variable costs (UVC). A further implication of this segment is that 
it may represent the range of operations over which price agreements are 
most apt to break down. The model is thus compatible with the common 
view that collusion is less likely in declining industries. The inclu-
sion of the second broken segment, kS, may be less appropraite. Over 
this small range, variable costs are rising so dramatically that they 
begin to cut substantially into the firms' previously profitable posi-
tion. Therefore, it may be more accurate to truncate the supply interval 
6 
at . point k, reasoning that orders beyond this point are either not 
accepted or are assigned extended delivery dates. Alternatively, firms 
may operate in this less profitable range with the longer-term interest 
of insuring good ·customer relations, especially if the boom d~mand is 
perceived as temporary. Generally speaking, however, the slight differ-
ence between SS and Skis trivial to the analysis. In presenting the 
hypotheses, SS is deemed the relevant supply interval. 
III. THE HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses and empi~ical test focus on the responsiveness of 
price to changes in short-run cost and demand factors. The hypotheses 
are specified in terms of a general price equation: . 
(2) P = a + Bl ( UVC >. + B 2 ( Dd) 
where Pis unit price, UVC is unit variable cost, and Dd is a demand 
variable. This section demonstrates that shared-monopoly pricing and 
target-return pricing offer empirically distinguishable predictions for 
the coefficients B1 and 82 • 
Figure 3 illustrates the price responses of the two models to 
changes in marginal costs. To facilitate comparisons, the diagrams are 
contrived such that identical cost curves (MC = UVC) yield initially 
identical prices (Pm= Pt). Now consider an equal increase in cost in 
each model, e.g., a shift from MC to MC' and UVC to UVC'. Joint-profit 
maximization requires that the industry reduce output from Q to Q' and 
raise price from P ~o P '. Precisely how much price adjusts vis-a-vis 
m m 
8 
output depends largely upon the elasticity of industry demand. Elimina-
ting the extremes of perfectly elastic and inelastic demand c.urves, it is 
clear that s1 must lie between zero and one. 
7 
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Within a target-return mod<:l, t he firm is understood to change 
prices when it recognizes a permanent change in its standard volume unit 
cost. For instance, the firm would · know to adjust its standard cost 
figure in the wake of a labor settlement or an announcement from suppliers 
that materials prices were to be increased. Under a target-return 
strategy, permanent cost increases are passed along fully in prices. 9 
This price response is shown in the right-hand diagram in Figure 3 • . In 
effect, the entire cost structure has shifted vertically by the amount of 
the unit variable cost change (cc' = bb' = aa'). The net result is that 
the target price is raised equally, from Pt to Pt' A pure target-return. 
model thus predicts that B1 will be equal to one. 
The analysis may now easily be expanded to include the implications 
of "full-cost" price behavior. Earlier it was · noted that the major 
distinction between full-cost and target-return pricing is simply whether 
unit variable cost is considered part of the rate base. In equation 
form, the full-cost price (Pf) is expressed 
(3) = (l+r) (UVC + UKC) s s . 
as distinct from the previous target price equation 
(1) P = UVC + (l+r) UKC t . s s 
The implication of equation (3) for the hypothese .s is that B1 will be 
greater than one. · Indeed, the difference between 81 anq unity should 
provide an · estimate of the make-up factor r. In sum, the size of B1 will 
indicate the pricing model followed by the industry -- a B1 significantly 
less than unity corroborates the shared monopoly model, exactly unity a 
target-return model, and greater than unity a full-cost scheme. 
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Turn now to Figure 4 where the price predictions for demand changes 
are illustrated. In terms of equation (2), we are interested in the 
. . 
value of the coefficient 82 . As was the case in Figure 3, the graphs are 
drawn such that equilibrium price and output are identical in both models 
prior to a shift in demand. It is evident from the diagrams that, 
~ollowing a shift in demand, the joint -profit maximizing result is unique 
from the target-return prediction. In the latter case, .the firm's 
short-run response is purely . an output adjustment within the supply 
interval. Thus the coefficient 82 is predicted to be zero (Pt= Pt'). 
In contrast, an industry that is maximizing joint-profits should display 
a 82 greater than zero. 
Combining the foregoing discussions of Figure 3 and 4, the formal 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hl: 0 < Bl < l and 82 > 0 + shared monopoly 
H2: B = 1 and B2 = 0 + target-return pricing 1 
H3: B > 1 and 62 C 0 + full-cost pricing 1 
where Bl and 82 are the coefficients of the unit variable cost and demand 
variables in a price equation. 
IV . ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The data for this study are from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. 
The data are 1958-1976 annual observations for price and production 
variables for 42 four-digit industries as defined in the 1972 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes. The qualifying characteristic for 
the sample is fewness, either in an absolute or relative sense. · The 
sample industries and details of the selection criteria . appear in the 
Appendix. 
9 
Since the middle 1960's, considerable empirical work has been done 
with the price equation in manufacturing industries. Notable studies are 
those by Eckst e in (6), Schultze and ';r'ryon (31), Eckstein and Fror.un (7], 
Eckstein and Wyss (8), Godley and Nordhaus (14), Ripley and Segal (29], 
Wilder [39), and Qualls [28) . However, the specific forms of the equa-
tion developed in most of these studies - are only indirectly applicable 
here. The present study examines four-digit SIC industries with annual 
observations as compared with the quarterly data and broader two- or 
three-digit aggregation of prior studies. This distinction influences 
the estimation procedure in two notable respects. 
First, annual data obviate the need for lags when modeling the speed 
of adjustment between variable cost changes and prices. This is a 
valuable simplification, since there is no strong agreement within the 
. 10 
quarterly studies .upon the appropriate lag structure. Estimates range 
from no lag to a six month lag, with a three to four month gestation 
11 perhaps the most tenable. Whatever the adjustment lag is, it is 
apparently well within the sphere of annual data, thus indicating no need 
for a lagged element in the equation. Furthermore, it is conceivable 
that as many as three variable cost changes may be captured within one 
year's price datum. These are important implications to emphasize. They 
bode well for the probable sensitivity of annual price data in capturing 
variable cost changes. 
A second distinction between this study and most prior research 
concerns the operational definition of "standard" costs. Recall that 
under target-return pricing firms are perceived to ba_se prices upon unit 
.cost incurred at "normal" _operating levels. Studies conducted either at 
10 
the _two-digit industry level or with quarterly data have notable advan-
tages in defining standard vo l ume. For one, indices of capacity utiliza-
tion exist at the two-digit level. · With such esd.mates, determining 
12 
standard cost is a straightforward procedure. Furthermore, quarterly 
data allow a secular definition of standard volume as a twelve-quarter 
moving average [30}, [.14}. Though both approaches to standardized cost 
have been supported empirically, neither method may be directly applied 
here. Utilization rates are not available at the four-digit level, and 
it is doubtful that the two-digit estimates could be extended in any 
meaningful way. The twelve-quarter moving average is also ruled out, 
· 13 because the data are annual. 
This definitional pro.blem is not insurmountable however. For 
example, Sylos-Labini argues that with annual data standardizing unit 
costs may not be necessary. He maintains that "for empirical tests, 
annual . data represents a reasonably good solution to the normalization 
problem" l36, p. 6]. Alternatively, Godley and Nordhaus {15] have 
treated annual standard volume as the level of output on the trend path. 
A similar approach is adopted here. Conceptually speaking, this approach 
is closely akin to the twelve-quarter moving average estimate, though 
technically the trend path value will not be as sensitive to structural 
shifts within the period as a moving average. 
The transformations and variables required for the· price equation 
are standard volUine, standard unit variable cost, and inventory-ship~ents 
ratio deviation. Consider each in . turn. Annual estimates of standard 
volume (Qs) for each of forty~two industries are obtained via the 
following algorithm. First, an in~ex or real output (Q) for the ith 
industry in the jth year is computed as 
11 
Q., = [S + liINV] 
• l. J 
. SPI ij 
(4) 
where · s = nominal value of 3nnual shipments, 6INV = nominal change in the 
value of year-end inve ntor ies, SPI = ship ments price index, i = one to 
forty-two ind ust ries, and j = years from 1959-1976. Real standard volume 
(Qs) for the ith industry in the jth year is then simply the 
corresponding fi t ted value for real output (Q) obtained by regressing 
output against time. Formally: 
(5) s Q ij - Qi£= a 1 + b1 (year) 
where a 1 and b1 are the OLS es timates obtained from the real output trend 
regression in each industry. 
Standard unit variable cost (UVCs) · is a composite of three direct 
cost components and is written 
uvc\j = . [ LC + ; + EC] 
[ i j 
(6) 
where LC = nomi-nal labor costs, MC = nominal ma terial cost, and EC = 
14 s. 
nominal energy cost. Since Q is based · upon the real output index 
derived in (5), any changes in variable expenditures are automatically 
adjusted for both productivity and real output changes. Therefore, the 
uvc5 variable acc urately captures the influence of input-price changes on 
standard unit cost. 
Two desirable features of this composite specification should be 
noted. First, by summing all variable cost components in the numerator, 
any changes in input prices are automatically weighted by factor shares. 
This is important because t.he effect of factor price changes on output 
prices . depends on both the size of the former and the input's production 
weight. Output pr .ice changes are not costless to the firm and thus it is 
12 
c6nceivable that the price of a relatively minor input could ris~ con-
siderably ~ithout having a perceptible effect on the price of output. 
A sec ·ond notable advantage of the composite specification over the 
individual variable cost components is that the former more effectively 
considers factor substitution that may occur over time due to changing 
relative factor prices. For example, rising energy costs rni~ht prompt 
increased expenditure on energy-saving labor. If this substitution were 
permanent, linear estimates fitted to separate energy and labor cost 
components might both show larger standard errors than the merged index. 
In short, substitution between factors in the numerator is internalized 
in the composite specification. 
The demand variable, Inventory-shipment s ratio deviation (ISRD), 
is constructed on the premise that firms typically rely upon inventories 
for adjustments to short swings in demand. Therefore, excessive changes 
in inventories vis-a-vis a desired buffer level may serve as the principal 
precursor of a demand-induced price change. In fact, the inventory-
shipments ratio can be a particularly sensitive variab~e because .demand 
conditions affect both the numerator··and the denominator in a manner 
. . l 15 
magnifying the appropriate signa. For example, increasing demand will 
simultaneously raise shipmen _ts and draw down inventories. Both changes 
reduce the value of the ratio. The sign of the partia~ relationship ' 
between price and the inventory-shipments ratio is negative (oSPI/oISR < 
0). This is noteworthy becaus e it is the reverse of the partial relation-
ship derived graphically in Section III. Therefore, the contingent 
demand relationship for monopoly pricing previously noted, S2 > O, is 
simply reversed to a2 < 0~ This reversal merely reflects the mechanics 
of an inventory-shipments ratio. Conceptually, the hypothesis is un-
changed. 
13 
The actual demand variable which is used underwent two technical 
adjustments, though in spirit it retains the inventory-shipments concept. 
First, the data for inventories are year-end observations. Because firms 
often run down their inventories at this time for accounting purposes, 
mid-year estimates may be more representative of year-to-year demand 
fluctuations. A proxy for mid-year inventories is taken to be an average 
of two successive year-end inventories. A second adj,ustment in the 
inventory-shipments .variable is warranted by the fact that roughly half 
of the industries displayed a statistically detectable downward, and in 
fewer cases upward, trend in .the inventory-shipments ratio. It thus 
seems more appropriate to cast the demand variable as deviations from the 
inventory-shipments trend line. Therefore, the demand variable uses the 
.residuals from the trend regression. 
The final price equation that ·is estimated is: 
(7) SPI = a + S (UVCs) + 82 (ISRD) + E o 1 . 
where SPI = the shipments price index, UVC5 = unit variable costs at 
standard volume, and ISRD = inventory-sales ratio deviations. 
Before examining the re ·sults, a few caveats surrounding the estima-
tion ·of equation (7) should be noted. First, the shipments price indices 
used here are based upon the Bureau of Labor Statistics' producer price 
indices (PPI). This presents a problem if one accepts the findings of 
Stigler and Kindahl [36]. They maintain that the PPI fails to reflect 
the possible difference between list prices and the more relevant trans-
action prices. If correct, the Stigler-Kindahl conclusion suggests that 
empirical studies will consistently underestimate the impact of falling 
demand on prices. It is also noteworthy, however, that two more recent 
studies, both interpreting the Stigler-Kindahl data, fail to corroborate 
14 
their findings. Indeed, Coutts et al conclude that, "inspe~tion of the 
aggregate results leads one to believe that the Stigler/Kindahl transac-
tion price index shows more signs of stickiness than the official index" 
[5, p. 7). Wei ss, somewhat less contradictory; simply concludes, "there 
is no significant bias in the two sets of series with respect to concen-
tration so the studies using BLS series ar-e meaningful" (j7 , p. 19]. 
From an econometric perspective, the time-series nature of the data 
. h . f . 1 1 · 16 raises t e issue o seria corre ation. Serial correlation proved to 
be a problem in roughly three-quarters of the industry regressions. To 
correct for this problem, a Cochrane-Orcutt iteration was performed. 
This procedure proved to be an adequate correction for all but a few 
industries in which the Durbin-Watson statistic remained in the indeter-
. . 17 
minate region. 
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Se.ction in demonstrated that monopoly pricing and mark-up pricing 
can be clearly distinguished in terms of the models' predicted price 
sensitivity to changes in variable costs and demand • . The testable 
hypotheses were formally stated: 
Hl :. 0 < 
_Bl < 1 and 82 < 0 + Shared Monopoly 
H2: 81 = 1 and 82 = 0 + Target-Return Pricing 
H3: . 8 > 1 and 82 = 0 + Full-Cost Pricing 1 
where s1 and 82 refer to the estimated coefficients for the unit variable 
cost and demand variables in a price equation. 
Table 1 lists ·eight industries meeting the conditions of shared 
monopoly as defined in H1 . For each industry included in Table 1, B1 
falls significantly between zero and · one, and the sign of 82 is appro-
15 
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priately nega t ive and significa~t. G~nerally, the results are of good 
statistical quality. · The results in Table 1 indicate that roughly 
one-fifth of the tight oligopolies _examined in this study approximate 
monopoly price conduct as defined in H1. The results suggest that 
monopoly pricing exists, but it is not so prevalent that it disturbs any 
a priori expectation one might have held. 
Table 2 contains the results conforming to the general hypothe _sis of 
mark-up pricing. Included are both target-return and full-cost pricing, 
encompassing both H2 and H3• These two results are distinguished within 
the table by reference to the second t-statistic reported under unit 
va;iable . cost (UVC5 ) • 18 The table reveals that nineteen industri~s, 
almost half ot' the sample, are contained within the general mark-up 
category. In all ·cases, the demand coefficient e2 is insignificant. 
Unit variable costs reflect price responsiveness closely paralleling 
either target-return pricing (81 = 1) or full-cost pricing (81 > 1). 
For example, the estimates of 81 for industrial gases, small arms 
ammunition, arid motor vehicles show a remarkably clean target-return 
result (81 = 1). Regarding full-cost pricing (1\ > 1) ,. the ~stimates of 
s1 for cane sugar, . beet sugar, earthenware utensils, primary copper, 
primary lead, metal cans, vehicular lighting, and electron tubes reflect 
19 
a "reasonable" percentage mark-up. Within the mark-up category neither 
target-return (nine industries) nor full-cost pricing (ten industries) 
dominates. 
The results .for the remaining fifteen tight oligopolies in the 
sample are reported in Table 3. These industries all evidence mark-up 
pricing in terms of variable cost changes (8 1 ~ 1), but they also display 
16 
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significant demand sensitivity <B2 < 0). An outcome of mark-up pricing 
with demand sensitivity is not a result that may be associated with 
e ithe _r pure monopoly pr ici ng or pure ·mark-up pricing. Though the simple 
dual proposition did encompass a ma j ority of the industry results (twenty-
seven of forty-two), r oughly one-third of the industry results sugge st a 
third category of mark-up pricin g with demand sensitivity. 
Before interpreting these findings, ohe general empirical result is 
noteworthy. In the past, . specification of the demand variable, particu-
larly with annual data, has . met with less than uniform success. 20 The 
fact that the ISRD specification reflected demand influences signifi-
cantly in twenty-three industries speaks well for the specification 
adopted in this study. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The focus of this paper has been on developing an empirical test 
that distinguishes two theoretical models of pricing in tight oligopoly. 
Arguably, these two models represent extrernes--monopoly pricing reflec-
ting pure j oint maximization and mark-~p pricing reflecting imperfect 
cooperative conduct. As the results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal, the 
empirical scheme performs well. Roughly one-fifth of the sample indus-
tries reflect pure monopoly pricing, and another half appear to be 
mark-up pricers. It is also noteworthy, however, that the test displays 
flexibility, identifying a third distinct category of mark-up pricing 
with demand sensitivity. 
Furthermore, the three observed pricing patterns lend themselves to 
plau s ible interpretation. Bain [l, p. 328) sets the keynote for one such 
interpretation quite clearly: 
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..• if the firms of an industry pursue a rigid margin-adding 
pqlicy--always adding the same uniform margin to normal average 
cost in order to determine price, regardless of the current rate 
of output demanded or of other immediate market considerations--
they can generally at best attain only a rough or crude long-rWI. 
approximaticn to the prices whi:ch would maximize joint or separate 
profits. Except under very special limiting conditions of demand 
and cost variation, precise month-to-month or year-to~year profit 
maximization {of whatever sort) would require · some variation of 
the margin with variations in demand and in the rate of output. 
However, appropriate choice of a certain rigid margin is 
potentially quite consistent with a long-run average approxi-
mation to a profit-maximizing price. And if the margins applied 
are indeed varied with varying market conditions, the pricing 
procedure in question is potentially consistent with fairly 
precise maximizing policies. {Emphasis added.) 
Bain' s distinction between "rigid" mark-ups and those that float with 
demand, and the parallel contrast b~tween "crude long-run" maximizing 
policies versus "fairly precise" ones, is clearly corroborated by Tables 
2 and 3. · · At the same time, the monopoly price implications revealed · in 
Table 1 should not be ignored. Consider the following. 
The pure mark-up policy may represent those industries where com-
plications in implementation or enforcement are particularly severe. In . 
such an environment, the pure mark-up policy .reflects the pragmatic . 
acceptance among industry members that the probable benefits of a more 
.finely honed mark-up policy--i.e., one attuned to demand~-are offset by a 
greater likelihood that more intricate methods of coordination may in 
f . . d. . 1· 21 act undermine industry isc1p ine. In this sense, strict adherence to 
simple mark-~p rules would seem to represent Fellner's concept of "quasi-
agreement" with special force. Mark-up pricing with demand sensitivity 
might then be interpreted as·a better administered collusive effort, 
indeed, a "fairly precise" approximation of monopoly conduct. Clearly, 
these interpretations are consistent with the respective results in 
Tables 2 and 3. However, neither interpretation directly acknowledges 
18 
the ideal, and it is in this regard that the results in Table 1 are 
relevant. In other words, pure mark-up pricers may do well from the 
standpoint of joint-profit maximization: indeed, plarhaps as well as 
possible given -their industry environment. But mark-up pricers sensitive 
to demand probably do better, leaving a few industries that appear to 
. . . 
approximate monopoly performance. Though this interpretation deserves 
further investigation, it is quite compatible with both profit maximizing 
behavior under varying administrative constraints, and the results. 
A second noteworthy implication of the results is that .mark-up 
pricing appears to be the predominant price-cost relationship (34 of 42 
industries), but then becomes a dual price pattern depending on . the 
significance of demand. The varying influence of demand within the 
general mark-up price pattern may represent the distinction between 
short-run and long-run maximizing conduct in tig~t oligopoly. As Bain 
n'otes, mark-ups which "indeed vary·with market conditions" may be read as 
"fairly precise maximizing polici~s • .,. Alternatively, some tight oligo-
polies may focus on long-run profits and thus price to deter entry •. 
Where this is the case, it is perfectly consistent that "limit" prices 
should not respond to rising demand since to do so might invite entry. 
eost changes, on the other hand; should .precipitate price changes since 
the limit-price level will vary directly and uniformly with cost condi-
tions. In this sense, the results in Table 2 versus Table 3 might be 
viewed as further support for - the relevance of the distinction between 
long-run and short-run rnaxirniiing behavior in oligopoly. Thus, the 
mark-up price results in general reflect pricing behavior consistent with 
profit maximization under an entry constraint. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Mark-up pricing is a generic term. There are actually several ways 
of formally spec i fying a model which captures the spirit of mark-up 
pricing. For exar.iple, the terMs "cost- plus ," "full-cost , " and "target- · · 
return" pricing each ·imply minor variations within the general mark-up 
theme. F~r ·a discussion of the se difference s, see Eckstein and Fromm [7, 
pp. 1165-66) and Ripley and Segal [29, p. 264]. Largely, the model 
presented here builds upon presentations by Blair [2], [3) and Eckstein 
and Fromm. 
2 Eckstein and Fromm [8, p. 1165]. 
3 It is impor tant to differentiate between the factors underlying this 
rising segment of UMC and tho se shifting the entire curve. Consider the 
following example. · A copper wire manufacturer with a given sales expec-
tation normai ly purchases copper rod in forward markets three months 
prior to deliv~ry for production. Say the firm buys May copper for 
delivery in August. Assume now that August wire demand runs higher than 
anticipated. Any extra production must occur with materials bought in 
the August spot market, at which time the price of copper rod is likely 
to have risen. As a result, unit costs rise, but only at near full-
capacity. For all previous units, the lower forward materials price 
determines cost. However., if the higher spot price is an accurate signal 
of future trends, then forward prices will also rise. It . is only in the 
case of higher forward contract prices, i.e., permanent price increases, 
that the UMC curve shifts. 
4 See Okun [25, pp. 107-114]. 
5 Constant marginal cost over a range has been a common finding in 
many empirical industry studies. As Heflebower states in his review of 
full cost pricing, "There is now significant evidence to the effect that, 
in manufacturing operations at least; · marginal costs do not vary for a 
fairly wide range of output . rates ..•. Downward from the neighborhood 
of the output for which the plant was designed as much as 30 percent •.• 
That marginal costs are horizontal in this range has been demonstrated 
almost without exception in statistical investigations." (18, p.320]. 
Also see Johnston (19). 
6 . . This is the major distinction between target-return and full-cost 
pricing that was noted earlie~. As will be shown in Section III, this 
difference can be tested empirically. 
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Given that price is a mark~up on unit costs, and that unit capital 
costs vary with output, it is obvious that the designation of standard 
volume is not an incidental aspect or price determination. Unfortunately, 
the theory offers no. clear rule on this point. While case studies of 
heavy manufacturing have indicated·that standard volume may fall in the 
range of 75 to 80 percent capacity, broader considerations would lead one 
to suspect that .''no~mal" utilization levels will vary substantially 
according to the type of industry. However, as a theoretical construct, 
one may assume that it represents 80 percent of plant capacity. In 
defense of this assumption, recognize that misspecification of standard 
volume only affects the initial price level. On balance, however, it 
does not alter the model's predictions regarding how that price level 
subsequently responds to either rising ~ost levels or shifts in demand. 
8 
· It could also depend on the slope of the marginal cost curve. 
course, as shown here, we are assuming a range of constant marginal 
costs. 
Of 
9 The purest of demand theory is inclined to balk at the notion of 
firms being able to pass cost increases along fully via price increases. 
Okun disc~sses the likelihood of such pass-throughs at length emphasizing 
the importance . of search cos~, transaction cost, and continuity in the 
buyer-seller relationship [25, pp. · 138-156). 
10 Nordhaus [24, p. 38). 
11 Eckstein and Fromm state, " ••• the adjustment process appears to be 
short, with much of the adjustment coming within three months, most of it 
within six" [7, p~ 1171). This conclusion is corroborated by slightly 
different evidence from a recent study of British manufacturing. Coutts, 
Godley, and Nordhaus found that the extremes in the length of production · 
periods over which price policy is likely to be. incremented run from nine 
to twenty-three weeks [5, pp~ 34-41). _ 
12 Eckstein and Fromm [7, ·pp. 1167-69). 
13 Furthermore, an annual moving average is too costly. With only 
nineteen observations, something as small as a three-year moving average 
would cost two degrees of freedom. Add to this the required adjustment 
for explanatory variables and the analysis is down to fourteen degrees .of 
freedom. 
14 Of the fifteen production variables included in the data base, 
energy cost was the only one for which a complete nineteen year time 
series was not available. Observations were for the years 1958, 1961, 
1963, 1967, 1971-1976. Therefore, the missing values in this variable 
were interpolated from the trend line fitted to the available energy 
observations. 
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There may be some concern whether the magnifying charac te ristic of 
the inventory-shipments r~tio is desirable. One might . contend that this 
imposes a specification bias in the equation. However, the author 
believes that the add .ed s·ensitivi ty of the ratio is desirable since the 
data are annual rather than quarterly . Clearly, detecting demand in-
fluences will be more difficult with annual data for two reasons: (1) 
one has fewer observations, and (2) the longer period between observa-
tions suggests that an interim lull in demand could go undetected by the 
data. 
16 Consideration was also given to the possibility of multicolline-
arity. Since the equation involves only two independent variables, · their 
simple correlation coefficient provides a sufficient test [20, p. 163]. 
The absolute mean value of the correlation coefficient between UVC and 
s ISRD was 0.29, indicating the lack of a problem.· 
17 The alternative correction procedure of first-differencing was not 
used here for two reasons. First, first-differencing would have cost an 
additional degree of freedom further reducing the statistical test to the 
fourte~n-degree level. Second, first-differences assumes the error term 
correlation (p) is equal to ±1 [27, pp. 110-11). This condition is not 
satisfied in t):le majority of industries. The absolute mean value of p on 
the final iteration was o.sa. 
18 In Table 3, two t-statistics are reported. The upper t.;.statistic 
tests whether the coefficient is significantly greater than zero. • The 
lower t-statistic tests whether the coefficient is equal to one, or 
greater than one. A single asterisk denotes 81 = 1, and a double 
asterisk denotes 81 > 1. 
19 A very rough approximation of the mark-up might be determined as 
follows. During the period ·1963-1977, the average after-tax return on 
stockholders' equity for manufacturers with assets over $1 billion was 
12.5 percent [30, p. 92). A corporate profit tax rate of 49 percent 
implies that the pre-tax return would be roughly twice the stockholder 
return thus in the vicinity of a 25 percent mark-up. Again, this a very 
crude estimate, but given the aggregated nature of the data, perhaps a 
rough approxi~ation is appropriate. 
20 See Nordhaus [24, pp. 41-42). 
21 As Scherer notes, "Poorly coordinated efforts to increase short-run 
profits under changing and uncertain demand and cost conditions can, 
through shortsightedne ss and misinterpretation, deteriorate into moves 
and counterrnoves that reduce rather than increase group profits." (30, p. 
1B8]. 
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLE OF TIGHT OLIGOPOLIES1 
Four-Firm 
Ind us tries SIC Number Concentration Coverage 
Code of Firms Ratio Ratio 
Cereal Breakfast 
Foods 2043 34 90 84 
Wet Corn Milling 2046 26 63 97 
Cane Sug~r · 
Refining 2 2062 22 60 98 Beet Sugar 2063 16 60 100 
Chewing Gum 2067 15 87 88 
Malt 2083 30 48 99 
Cigarettes 2111 13 84 100 
Tire Cord and 
Fabric 2296 9 84 97 
Pressed and ~lded 
2646 32 85 Pulp Goods 3 97 Industrial Gases 2813 105 72 92 
Cellulosic Man-
made Fibers . 2823 12 96 95 
Organic Fibers, 
Noncellulosic 2824 36 74 97 
Carbon Black 2895 11 74 95 
Flat Glass . 3 4 3211 11 92 95 Glass Containers ' 3221 27 80 99 
Vitreous China 2 Food Utensils 3262 .32· 60 88 
Fine Earthware 2. Food Utensils 3263 17 60 97 
Gypsum 3275 44 $0 97 
Mineral Wool 3296 66 75 93 
Electrometallurgical 
Products 4 3313 27 74 87 Primary Copper 3331 11 80 98 
Primary Lead 3332 12 93 98 
Primary Zinc 3333 11 66 70 
Primary Aluminum 3334 12 91 76 
Aluminum Sheet, 
Plate, a~d Foil 3353 24 65 99 
Metal Cans 3411 134 90 98 
Smal l Arms 
Ammunition 3482 57 89 ~8 
Carbon and Graphite 
Products 3624 58 86 98 
Household Refrig-
e .rators, Freezers 3632 30 85 85 
Household Laundry 
Equipment 3633 20 83 91 
Household Vacuum 
Cleaners 3635 34 75 85 
Sewing Machines 3636 72 84 93 
23 (continued) 
APPENDIX--Continued 
F'our-Firm 
Indu s tri e~ ·src Number Concentration Covera9e 
Code of Firms Ratio Ratio 
Vehicular Lighting 
Equipment 3647 '16 78 94 
Telephone, Tele-
graph Apparatus 3661 157 94 99 
Electron Tubes, 
Receiving Type 3671 21 89 94 
Cathode Ray TV 
Picture Tubes 3672 69 83 98 
Primary Batteries, 
Dry and Wet 3692 30 85 98 
Motor Vehicles and 
Car Bodies 3711 165 96 100 
Aircraft Engines, 
Engine Parts 3724 189 77 94 
Guided Missiles, 
Space Vehicles 3761 23 62 95 
Space Propulsion 
Units, Parts 3764 · 22 59 87 
Tanks and Tank 
Components 3795 18 99 77 
Photographic 3 Equip., Supplies 3861 555 80 96 
Hard Surface Floor 
Coverings 3996 18 91 99 
1 AA industry is considered a tight oligopoly .depending on either of 
two structural conditions. One, the four-firm -concentration ratio must 
exceed 75 perscent. This cirterion is - consistent with Palmer's [26] 
finding that a proclivity for collusion appeared to set _in for CR4>70 percent. Also, until the revision in Ju .ne of 1982, a CR4 greater than 75 percent was groun~s for deny i ng a horizonal merger und er the Justice 
Department Merger Guidelines of 1968. · An alternative condition for 
inclusion in the sample is that the number of firms in the industry be 
less than thirty-five~ The selection of this figure was largely a 
function of the data. Analysis of the nwnber of firms across · industrie.s 
revealed a clear lapse between thirty-five and fifty firms. Therefore, 
thirty-five was selected as th@. ceiling. The data on CR4 and the nwnber 
of firms are those for 1972. These 1972 statistics will thus be defining 
the sample for the entire 1958-1976 period. Obviously, then, a substan-
tial degree of s tructura l stability is being assumed for this period. 
However, empirical studies of concentration trends in manufacturing 
support this assumption. See Scherer [30, pp. 67-74). 
2 Products are considered substitutes and thus the market.definitions 
are too narrow. Following Qualls (28),the CR4 is weighted average across 
substitute markets. 
3 Product class 
adjusted CR4 . 
is too broadly defined. Adopted Shepherd 's (33} 
4 Markets are regional. Adopted Shepherd's [33) adjusted CR4• 
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